http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/71 Sat, 02 May 2026 20:21:34 GMT 2026-05-02T20:21:34Z http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/89 The Indirect Purchaser Rule and Private Enforcement of Antitrust Law: A Reassessment Smith, Spencer Despite broad statutory language authorizing “any person” injured by an antitrust law violation to sue for damages, the Supreme Court of the United States has construed that language to bar antitrust damages claims by indirect purchasers, such as consumers two or more steps removed from antitrust violators. The Court and some scholars have justified the indirect purchaser rule on the ground that assigning direct purchasers exclusive rights to recover antitrust damages increases the likelihood of suit. But this article presents new evidence that the rule reduced private antitrust litigation by twenty percent. It argues that the rule should be abandoned, consistent with the statutory text. Thu, 25 Feb 2021 00:00:00 GMT http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/89 2021-02-25T00:00:00Z http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/88 The Antitrust Market does not Exist: Pursuit of Objectivity in a Purposive Process Eben, Magali structure available evidence and enable a comprehensive answer to a particular question. They do not exist as such in the real world but are figments of our intellectual imagination. In that capacity, they can be immensely useful. A pursuit of objectivity in the process of product market definition remains in vain as long as we fail to acknowledge that the utility of antitrust markets lies precisely in their reductive and purposive nature. This article makes two main arguments. The first argument is simple, yet far-reaching: antitrust market definition is useful because it is a method to enable the answer to a question. The implication is that the market is defined by reference to that particular question, rather than as an independent and neutral object. Market definition is ‘purposive’. In the context of competition investigations, this question can concern, but does not have to be limited to, determinations of market power. The second argument is that market definition, even though purposive, does not need to be subjective. Objectivity in market definition can be achieved by aspiring to process objectivity, rather than to objective outcomes Wed, 17 Mar 2021 00:00:00 GMT http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/88 2021-03-17T00:00:00Z http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/87 The Antitrust Case against the Apple App Store Geradin, Damien; Katsifis, Dimitrios The Apple App Store is the only channel through which app developers may distribute their apps on iOS. First launched in 2008, the App Store has evolved into a highly profitable marketplace, with overall consumer spend exceeding $50 billion in 2019. However, concerns are being increasingly expressed on both sides of the Atlantic that various practices of Apple with regard to the App Store may breach competition law. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether this is indeed the case and, if so, how these concerns can be addressed. With these aims in mind, the paper first introduces the reader to the app ecosystem and the Apple App Store, with a focus on Apple’s in-app payment policies and the 30 percent commission charged for in-app purchases. After engaging critically with the distinction between apps selling “digital” and apps selling “physical” goods or services, we consider such distinction is unclear, artificial, and unprincipled. The paper then critically reviews several practices of Apple that appear to be at odds with competition law and in particular Article 102 TFEU. We first analyze the issue of market definition and dominance with regard to the App Store. We find that Apple is a monopolist in the market for app distribution on iOS, as it is not subject to any meaningful competitive constraint from alternative distribution channels, such as Android app stores. The result is that Apple is the gateway through which app developers have to go to reach the valuable audience of iOS users. This bottleneck position affords Apple the power to engage in several prima facie anticompetitive practices. A first concern is that Apple may exploit app developers by charging excessive fees for the services it provides and by imposing unfair trading conditions. Second, based on four case studies, the paper illustrates how Apple may use its control of the App Store or iOS to engage in exclusionary behavior to the detriment of rival apps. These practices should be investigated by competition authorities, as they are likely to result in considerable consumer harm, be it in the form of higher app prices, worse user experience or reduced consumer choice. The paper finally proposes a combination of concrete remedies that would address the competition concerns identified Mon, 05 Apr 2021 00:00:00 GMT http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/87 2021-04-05T00:00:00Z http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/86 Incentivizing Private Antitrust Enforcement to Promote Leniency Applications Lai, Sinchit Both leniency programs and private antitrust enforcement are essential in combating cartels. The literature demonstrates that society benefits from both increased private actions and leniency applications. However, the present view is that private enforcement discourages cartel members from seeking leniency. Proponents of this view blame follow-on civil actions in the wake of successful public antitrust enforcement cases. This concern hinders the development of private antitrust enforcement. Nevertheless, the literature that expresses such a concern fails to consider standalone civil actions’ impact. Building on a game theory model of leniency programs by Professor Joseph E. Harrington, this article reinvestigates the relationship between the two seemingly contradictory procedural devices of leniency programs and private enforcement. Considering a revised leniency game, this article reveals that incentivizing private antitrust enforcement does not necessarily discourage leniency applications. Accordingly, this article proposes ways for legislators to use private enforcement as a tool to promote leniency applications Tue, 21 Jul 2020 00:00:00 GMT http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/86 2020-07-21T00:00:00Z http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/85 Competitive Harm Crossing Borders: Regulatory Gaps and a Way Forward Martyniszyn, Marek This article analyses the current regulatory framework governing transnational restrictive business practices. It identifies key gaps that provide room for anticompetitive practices to flourish, causing cross-border transfer of wealth, typically from less affluent states. The economic harm caused by cross-border anticompetitive conduct is significant; international cartels alone caused overcharges exceeding $1.5 trillion in the period 1990–2016. This article offers a series of pragmatic policy recommendations that could narrow existing regulatory gaps. The proposals require no international negotiations and can be implemented domestically. They call for enabling of more assertive and robust extraterritorial enforcement of domestic competition laws and facilitation of positive externalities in that context. Oxford University Press Thu, 14 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/85 2021-01-14T00:00:00Z http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/84 Towards a more Competitive Mobile Payment Industry: Standardization and Beyond Yan, Xingyu Mobile payments are becoming increasingly popular around the world. In countries like China, they appear in the form of barcode payments and are poised to replace cash and bank card payments for day-to-day consumer purchases. Against that backdrop, this paper analyzes the availability of barcode standardization as an approach to interoperability and ultimately to enhanced competition in the mobile payment industry. It uses the Chinese industry as a study case, which features a duopoly structure and shifting competitive dynamics among three definable groups of market players. This paper confirms that standardization can enhance competition and argues that, in this case, a government-mandated standardization is preferable to a voluntary one because the latter is prone to financial market failures. Along this line, this paper makes three suggestions for furthering the barcode standardization. It also advises prudence and competitive neutrality for the financial regulator and calls for more active involvements of the competition and data protection authorities. Sat, 26 Dec 2020 00:00:00 GMT http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/84 2020-12-26T00:00:00Z http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/83 The Simple Economics of Wholesale Price-Parity Agreements: The Case of The Airline Tickets Distribution Industry Padilla, Forge; Picolo, Salvator This paper clarifies the differences between retail and wholesale price-parity agreements in vertical industries. In contrast to traditional wide and narrow retail price-parity arrangements, the competitive effects of wholesale price-parity depend on the complexity of the vertical supply chain, the business model operated by sellers and distributors, and the strength of competition between direct and indirect distribution channels. While retail price-parity agreements are almost always anticompetitive, wholesale price-parity agreements may positively affect consumer welfare when direct and indirect distribution channels are close substitutes. To demonstrate the relevance of our analysis for competition policy, we illustrate our findings by referring to an industry that has recently attracted policy and regulatory interest on both sides of the Atlantic: the airline ticket distribution industry. We find that, in this industry, while wholesale price-parity agreements always harm airlines, Global Distribution Systems (GDSs) have preferences more aligned with consumers: when consumers benefit from these provisions, GDSs benefit too Mon, 30 Nov 2020 00:00:00 GMT http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/83 2020-11-30T00:00:00Z http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/82 Protecting and Fostering Online Platform Competition: The Role of Antitrust Law Baker, Jonathan This essay provides a perspective on the role of antitrust law in protecting and fostering competition in the digital economy, with particular attention to online platforms. It highlights the danger of anticompetitive exclusionary conduct by dominant online platforms and describes ways that antitrust law can challenge and deter such conduct. The essay also identifies a number of difficulties that U.S. courts and enforcers face in challenging harmful exclusionary conduct by dominant platforms, and discusses some ways that regulation can supplement antitrust law in fostering competition. Many of these themes are pursued in more detail in my book, The Antitrust Paradigm, 1 though in some places, this discussion goes beyond the book. Although some of the problems discussed here are distinctive to the United States, others can impede enforcement in all jurisdictions. These issues are increasingly salient in the United States. The House Judi ciary Committee’s antitrust subcommittee recently conducted a high-profile investigation into competition in digital markets. The majority (Democratic) issued a staff report at the end of the investigation that targeted Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google—the four digital platforms it called dominant. The report detailed platform conduct said to exploit platform users and discourage platform competition.2 It identified a number of possible legislative remedies to combat the problem, including changes to the antitrust laws and new regulatory rules. Concerns about the four platforms were bipartisan: all but one of the subcommittee members in the minority (Republicans) endorsed the description of the harmful conduct of large technology firms in digital markets, though they took issue with some of the legislative recommendations. Fri, 15 Jan 2021 00:00:00 GMT http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/82 2021-01-15T00:00:00Z http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/81 Personal Data Portability in the Platform Economy: Economic Implications and Policy Recommendations Kramer, Jan Article 20 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) gave consumers in the European Union the right to port their personal data between digital service providers. We critically assess the economic implications of this new right in the light of the extant economic literature and with a focus on competition and innovation in the digital platform economy. In particular, we conclude that observed user behaviour data should clearly fall under the scope of data portability and that, above and beyond the regulations set out under GDPR, a right to port personal data continuously and in real-time would be necessary to truly empower consumers in the context of the digital platform economy. We also discuss the economics of Personal Information Management Systems (PIMSs), which many policymakers see as an essential tool for consumers in an economy where data portability becomes more widespread. However, we are sceptical that PIMS will be self-sustainable and instead advocate to facilitate the development of open-source projects, which have made little progress so far due to a lack of interfaces (which would come about with a right to continuous data portability) and due to a lack of common standards. Wed, 25 Nov 2020 00:00:00 GMT http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/81 2020-11-25T00:00:00Z http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/80 Interim Measures in Antitrust Investigations: An Economic Discussion Caminade, Juliette; Chapsal, Antoine After a period of dormancy, the topic of interim measures (IMs) in antitrust investigations has been brought back into the spotlight in the context of fast moving digital markets. We analyze historical practices and criteria surrounding IMs in the United States and Europe. Then we present an economic model of the parameters underlying IMs, which can inform the decision of whether to pursue them. The two key parameters needed to determine the benefits of taking an IM are the relative magnitudes of irreparable harm to each party and the probability that the conduct is found to be anticompetitive. A resulting insight is that the overall size of the irreparable harms is not as relevant as their relative size (that is, asymmetry). Increasing both types of harm in the same proportion would not change the decision to use an IM. However, an increase in the overall size of irreparable harms increases the expected benefit from IMs as a tool, if they are used optimally. Finally, we examine the characteristics of the digital economy, finding that while such characteristics are likely to increase the benefits of IMs as a general tool, there is a need to carefully assess IM decisions on a case-by-case basis. Wed, 30 Dec 2020 00:00:00 GMT http://192.168.10.53/handle/123456789/80 2020-12-30T00:00:00Z